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A summary of the Dutch decisions on private international law
should not be considered as a codification on a small scale of settled
Dutch law concerning this subject. Judicial decisions have quite a
different weight in the United States from what they have in Holland,
and it is this difference which we intend to explain in this short intro-
duction, lest the reader should attach greater importance to the follow-
ing chapters than they deserve.
In Holland a "precedent" is not a solid rock upon which one may
rely. Any decision in a matter which the written law does not very
positively settle, is apt to be followed by a deviating decision to-morrow.
The lower judges are perfectly free to render a different judgment
from that of the Supreme Court of the Netherlands (Hooge Raad
der Nederlanden) or the Court of Appeal. However, it is the duty
of the Supreme Court to set aside judgments when the written law
has been infringed or misinterpreted. The Supreme Court will of
course follow its own view in the interpretation of the law. It is
advisable, therefore, for the lower judges to follow the ordinary inter-
pretation adopted by the Supreme Court, for otherwise their decisions
will most probably be reversed.
There is no duty, however, to follow the ordinary decisions. Al-
though it is advisable to accept the principles laid down by the
Supreme Court, deviation therefrom is not a ground of defense in the
lower court, and sometimes a judge has the pleasure of seeing that
the Supreme Court agrees with him, changing its former views. More-
over, the decisions of co6rdinate tribunals carry little, if any, weight.
Any court in the Netherlands applies the law just as it thinks it should
be, without regard to the decisions of courts situated in other parts of
the country. The decisions of the particular appellate court imme-
diately above the judge who pronounces the judgment may have a
lasting influence.
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Another circumstance restricting the weight of judicial decisions
in this country is that the situations presented by private international
law offer so much variety that many of them have not been decided
by judges, especially not in a small country like Holland. It is true
that there are a number of excellent periodicals in which all important
decisions of the different countries are published, but in addition to
the questions dealt with in the actual decisions there are a great many
others. The lawyer requested to give an opinion on such a question,
and the author who tries to answer it, usually follow the prevailing
view among the text-writers. The courts also often refer to the views
of such writers. In the discussion below it will be necessary now and
then to state the opinion of authors concerning certain problems, be-
cause their opinion-just as in the law of nations-has a very large
authority.
We mentioned above the general control of the Supreme Court over
the lower courts, guaranteeing that the lower judges will not render
decisions differing too much from the usual interpretation of Dutch
written law. The law which allots this task to the Supreme Court
only mentions infringement and misapplication of the law. The
Supreme Court has jurisdiction, therefore, to determine whether the
Dutch judge omitted to apply a provision of a foreign law which
according to Dutch law he was bound to apply, but that Court is
powerless to do anything after the judge has applied the foreign law,
even if it be in an erroneous way.' All decisions concerning the inter-
pretation of foreign law are withdrawn, therefore, from the general
control of the Supreme Court, so that the judge has complete liberty,
provided he observes the provisions of the Dutch law.
To offset this drawback there is another circumstance which in-
creases the weight attached to the decided cases and to the views of
text-writers. The Dutch codes contain only a few legal provisions
concerning private international law. The gaps must be filled, there-
fore, by the decisions of the courts. The Dutch courts apply foreign
law in a very liberal way when the nature of the matter, equity, or
the general needs of international intercourse require it. The decision
is often the result of a thorough consideration of the tendency of Dutch
legal provisions and their influence on the matter. Such provisions
sometimes concern national matters only; ometimes they intend to
operate also in the international sphere, either because they are of
predominating moral or public importance, or because the foreign law
in question, if determining the matter, would be at war with Dutch
notions of domestic policy and morals. A law will often be applied
after comparing various laws with each other, and taking cognizance
of the principles prevailing in all Civilized countries, i. e., of the
1 Sup. Ct (Nov. 27, c868) Weekblad van het recht, 3073 and (March ig, x99)
Weekblad van het recht, 8844. This periodical will'be indicated as "W."
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principles of common international law or a kind of private law cor-
responding to the principles adopted by all mankind.
2
STATUS AND CAPACITY
When a legal question has connection with more than one country,
one spe~ks about a conflict of laws. In choosing the applicable law,
two methods may be followed. The matter may either be dealt with as
a conflict, and a law is chosen which offers the greatest connection with
the matter, or harmony may be sought by applying the rules which
respect the various laws as much as possible and correspond most to
general international intercourse. These rules constitute, as it were, a
common international law.
The contrast between these two methods can be identified with the
names of the two leading Dutch authors on private international law,
viz. the former with Kosters, the latter with Josephus Jitta.3 The
renowned lawyer, T. M. C. Asser, felt inclined to consider the matter
as a conflict of laws.4 The decided cases show many examples of
both methods, but the doctrine of the conflict of laws is predominating.
Both methods often come to the same result. This is especially so with
regard to status and the capacity of persons. Everyone chooses the
law governing the person as that which follows the individual every-
where.
But what law is this? Residence only is disregarded by the Dutch
judges, because travelling across the frontier does not change one's
personal law. Generally speaking, the alternative is to be found in
nationality and domicil. Sometimes, however, notions of public policy
and good morals may have a great influence; moreover, the conse-
quences of the principle of "renvoi," the autonomy of the parties as
to the choice of a suitable law, and the doctrine of fraudulent evasion
of the law, may cause exceptions to the rules, so that neither nationality
nor domicil is decisive, but the ler fori is applied.
According to the settled law of the Netherlands nationality de-
termines the law governing this matter. This does not entirely agree
with the historical significance of the statum personale in this country.
Gradually Dutch lawyers have abandoned the doctrine of the rule of
domicil, though some centuries ago, all Dutch authors were adherents
of this theory. Nevertheless, we do not go as far as the Italian school
in adhering to the principle of nationality; in Holland people are
'The author follows Jitta's view of the conflict of laws, one which contrasts
sharply with the view prevalent in Anglo-American jurisprudence. See a review
of Jitta's latest book, The Renovation of Internationai Law, in (i92o) 29 YALE
LAw JOURNAL, 700.
'J. Kosters, Het internationaal burgerlijk recht in Nederland (1917);
Josephus Jitta, Internationaal privaatrecht (1916). These two works will be
mentioned as "Kosters" and "Jitta."
' T. M. C. Asser, Schets van het internationaal privaatrecht.
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not subjected to their national law in every respect. We want a
permanent standard governing the whole individual and possessing a
conspicuous character. This standard should be applied also abroad.
Domicil is apt to be altered and is therefore unfit for the purpose.
The personal law of the citizen is so closely connected with the history,
climate, and tradition of his country, that everybody born under the
government of that law ought to be governed by it, wherever he goes.
As regards Dutch law, this rule is to be found in article 6 of the
law containing general provisions of legislation in the kingdom,
which gives some general provisions on private international law.5
This article tells us that the laws concerning the rights, status, and
capacity of persons follow Dutch subjects abroad. The article indi-
cates the law governing "status," that is to say, minority, legitimacy,
guardianship, etc. "Capacity" means the power to act with or with-
out legal assistance, for example, the power to marry, to conclude con-
tracts, to appear as a legal representative. The Supreme Court has
decided that the capacity of a trustee, according to English law, belongs
to the "capacity" mentioned in this article." It also includes power
to dispose of movables and immovables; the lex rei sitae does not
govern this point.
"Rights" does not include all subjective rights, but only those con-
nected with personal capacity. Rights of inheritance and the law
relating to contracts are not considered to be subject to the national
law. Our courts reckon among "rights" the prohibition of adoption
and of divorce by mutual consent. The judges have of course much
freedom in applying this rule. In this way it was decided that the
question of the recognition of an illegitimate child by the father should
be judged according to the national law of the child, especially as to
the question whether the assent of the mother is a necessary condition
to such recognition.
7
Corporations are dealt with in the same way. The country in which
they reside determines their nationality, the latter following each cor-
poration abroad. Some time ago, in keeping with the current of public
opinion in belligerent countries, a tendency arose to consider the nation-
ality of the majority of shareholders or directors of jointstock com-
panies as the decisive point. Professor Molengraaff, of the University
of Utrecht, is one of the chief supporters of this point of view.8 Until
now it has not been adopted by the courts.
In the case of a partnership the nationality of the partners is always
examined, because the partners are independent and individually re-
'Law of May 15, 1829, Staatsblad, 129. This statute will be indicated as "Wet
Alginemeene Bepelingen" or "Wet A. B."
'Sup. Ct. (Feb. 22, 185o) W. 1139.
'Trib. Amsterdam (June 26, 1911) W. 94--2; Ct. of App. Amsterdam (May 2,
1913) W. 9557.
'W. L. P. A. Molengraaff, in (1918) De Gids, 291.
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sponsible. The nationality of each of them ought, therefore, to be
determined separately, and the judge must decide which of the partners
of a foreign firm should give bail when the firm is a plaintiff.
9
The national law is applied both to foreigners in Holland and to
Dutchmen staying abroad. Formerly foreigners were not on the same
footing as Dutchmen. They did not participate in the social life, but
only enjoyed a certain "natural" right, for the sake of humanity,
while the "civil" rights were granted to natives alone. Article 9 of
the Dutch Wet A. B. declares that the civil law of the Kingdom is
the same for foreigners and Dutchmen, as long as the law does not
positively state the contrary. This clause does not mean that all pro-
visions of Dutch law are applicable equally to foreigners and to citizens.
In the first place, even Dutchmen are often subject to foreign law, just
as foreigners may be. Secondly, if the judge were absolutely obliged
to apply Dutch law to foreigners, while foreign judges might subject
a Dutchman to his own national law, a wrong might be done to the
foreigner. The provision was intended to extend to foreigners the
enjoyment of all civil rights to the same extent as they are enjoyed
by natives, and to put an end to the spirit of intolerance. It does not
go any farther. The courts usually connect article 9 with article 6,
holding that the personal status of foreigners in Holland is governed
by their national law.10 In the same way the law governing matri-
monial property of foreigners who have married abroad, is governed
by their national law." Dutch judges may deprive an Austrian father
of his parental power, because Austrian law permits this.'
2
There are some exceptions to the rule of equalization between for-
eigners and Dutchmen, especially concerning matters of procedure,
which are survivals of the time when foreigners were discriminated
against (seizure, giving bail, imprisonment for debt, succession, etc.).
We only mention these matters here in passing.3
With relation to the competence of the Dutch judge to alter the
status of persons of another nationality, it has been held by the Su-
preme Court that Dutch Courts may pronounce a divorce between
foreigners, but that such a divorce is only possible for causes specified
by the Dutch law, as the lex fori, so that as regards foreigners this
matter does not depend upon their national law."
'Trib. Utrecht (June IZ, 1goo) Weekblad voor privaatrecht, notarisanzbt en
registratie, No. 2541. This periodical will be indicated by "W. P. N. R."
" Sup. Ct. (May 31, 1907) W. 8553; (Jan. 5, 1917), (1917) Nederlandsche
Jurisprudentie, 143. This periodical will be referred to as "N. J." We shall
meet more examples in dealing with particular matters.
'Sup. Ct. (January 8, 1915) W. 9762.
" Ct. Amsterdam (June ai, 191M) W. 9869.
'Code of Procedure, arts. 127, 152, 585, 768, 885; law of April 7, 1869,
Staatsblad, 56, in connection with arts. 884 and 957 of the Civil Code; Com-
mercial Code (Wetboek vat Koophandel), arts. 310, 316, and 748.
"4Sup. Ct. (Dec. 13, 1907) W. 8636.
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As regards Dutchmen abroad, the principle of the application of
his national law neither affects the jurisdiction of foreign courts, nor
the application in other countries of foreign rules of procedure. It is
true, there is a decision to the effect that the status of Dutchmen can
only be altered by their national courts according to Dutch law,1 5 but
this decision is an isolated one. As a rule, foreign decrees relating
to the status of Dutchmen are considered valid, unless Dutch public
policy is affected thereby. We meet such recognition of foreign judg-
ments in a decision of the Supreme Court, holding that a divorce pro-
nounced by a court in the United States of America betveen Dutchmen,
with due observance of the Dutch provisions relating to divorce, is
valid.'
It may be observed that sometimes a court is inclined to apply the
national law to a matter as a whole, and besides this to apply to each
of the persons playing an inferior part in the matter his own national
law. This, of course, may concern foreigners as well as Dutchmen.
In these cases the Dutch law will apply only one law to all these per-
sons, viz. that which governs the whole subject-matter. In this way
the power of foreigners to prevent marriages by legal opposition
is always governed by the personal law of the betrothed, not by the
law of the person desiring to prevent the marriage. The power of
a woman to be a guardian is to be determined according to the national
law of the child, not according to the national law of the woman her-
self. There are some exceptions: it is held that the right to demand
the guardianship of a lunatic is governed by the law of the person who
demands it, not by the national law of the lunatic."
Generally speaking, a change of nationality subjects the status to
the new fiationality. A Dutch minor becomes of age in marrying a
Dutchman, but not when she marries an Austrian, because in doing
so she acquires the Austrian nationality and according to Austrian
law marriage does not cause a woman to become of age.
Transactions entered into prior to a change of nationality are gov-
erned, however, by the former national law. Vested rights are re-
spected, though all new circumstances are governed by the new law.
When a person is of age according to his former personal law, but
still under age according to the new law, such a vested right is re-
spected, notwithstanding the new nationality. Where the status of
a man has been determined in a certain country by authority-for
example, by the nomination of a guardian-such a status remains as
it is, though the nationality of the ward has altered, up to the moment
the magistrates of the new country make new provisions in the
matter.'
8
"3Sup. Ct. (June 16, 19o5) W. 8248.
"Sup. Ct. (Nov. 24, 1916) W. x1o98, (917) N. J. S.
lTTrib. 's Hertogenborch (Dec. 23, Igio) W. 917.
" Trib. Amsterdam (Nov. 17, I91) W. 9366.
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A change of nationality has its importance also in connection with
the doctrine of fraudulently evading the law."
9 Does a change of
nationality cause annulment, if such change is made for the purpose of
performing acts which have no validity in the Netherlands? Many
people think that such an act will be valid' and that the change of
nationality does not affect its validity.
2 0 According to this theory the
old personal law would not be applicable when the connections with
Dutch law have disappeared. Others deny the validity of such acts,
when they have an immoral character or tend to evade Dutch law or
injure the rights of a third person. Nevertheless, an act performed
after a change of nationality deserves to be admitted as valid, with
this exception, that such recognition is to be denied when the intention
has been to evade the domestic policy of the Dutch law, even though
the person concerned has obtained a re-naturalization in Holland.
Such is the case where a Dutchman alters his nationality in order to
marry his former accomplice in adultery, a marriage which Dutch law
prohibits.21 Our courts have not had an opportunity, however, to
decide this question, so that we are without judicial authority in the
matter.
THE FORM OF LEGAL ACTS
Even the older Dutch authors applied the law of the loci actus to
the form of acts. One of them, Paul Voet, used to classify the pro-
visions relating to the form of acts into a separate category of statutes,
viz. the statuta mixta by way of contrast with the statuta personalia
and realia.
The reason for this rule in the beginning was the idea that in per-
forming acts an individual submits himself voluntarily to the sover-
eignty of the State in which he is acting. Later on, the statutum
mixtur was justified on the ground of convenience, in order to facili-
tate intercourse; it ought not to be necessary for a person to observe
the forms of his personal or is domiciliary law in a foreign country,
and the observance of the forms prescribed by the law of the country
where one is acting should be considered to be sufficient. Besides, it
would sometimes be impossible to follow one's proper law, because
the local officials might not be able to observe its provisions, or such
officials might not exist in the place. That is why article I0 of the
Dutch Wet A. B. declares: "The form of all acts is determined by
the laws of the country or the place where those acts are performed."
It is quite certain that, as a consequence of this provision, an act
executed abroad, being valid by the law in force in such a country,
has to be recognized in Holland. Our courts hold the same as to the
validity of mortgages, given in England according to English law.
22
"Kosters, 17o. "Asset, op. cit. note 3, at p. 43.
'Art. 89, Dutch Civil Code.
" Ct. The Hague (Dec. 24, 1915), (I9z6) N. J. 62=.
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However, it is very difficult to say whether our rule has an optional
or a mandatory character; whether an act, which is void according
to the lex loci, can be considered as valid in the Netherlands. Opinions
differ with respect to this question. Most of the authors are inclined
to say that the rule is strictly mandatory. According to this doctrine
it is indifferent whether an act is valid as to the national or domiciliary
law or to the lex rei sitae: it must conform to the lex loci actus
23
Josephus Jitta, who looks upon article IO of the Wet A. B. as indi-
cating only a direction, also tends to the opinion that the rule is
mandatory, but proposes by way of safety-valve that it has an optional
character wherever the application of the lex loci would lead to
irrational consequences.2
4
The decisions of the Supreme Court are not very conclusive, but are
inclined to prefer the mandatory character of the rule. The Court
directs the judges to examine whether a bill drawn abroad according to
the law of that country is in fact a bill so far as the formal requisites are
concerned, and regards article IO of the Wet A. B. as violated if the
judge neglects to make this examination. But the Court does not
answer the question whether the bill can be regarded as such ty virtue
of some other law, if the lex loci has not been observed.2 5
Other jurists, following the view of the older Dutch authors, are
opposed to such a severe doctrine and regard the rule as an optional
one. Among other arguments they appeal to the provisions of the
Hague treaties, in which this character of the rule has been recog-
nized. 25  Moreover, they rightly say that the rule in this form tends
to facilitate international trade and to promote legal security. It could
never have been the legislator's intention to invalidate an act in
consequence of this rule, if, but for this provision, the act would have
been valid. According to this doctrine the observance of the rules of
another law than the lex loci actus is sufficient. The above-mentioned
treaties, for example, are sometimes satisfied if the personal law com-
mon to the parties is complied with. Excepting the cases involving
application of these treaties, Dutch jurisprudence furnishes no in-
stances where a legal transaction which did not satisfy the formal
requirements of the law has been sustained by reference to another
law.
The rule, "locus regit actum," governs only the form of acts, but
not the consequences of acts concerning movables and immovables.
These consequences are submitted to their proper law. This is shown
by the following example. A gift of real estate situated in the
Netherlands was made in Prussia according to the local form, viz. by
2 Asser, op. cit. note 3, at p. 44; Opzoomer, Aanteekening op de Wet A. B., 189 .
24 Jitta, 138-140.
"Sup. Ct. (June 4, 1915) W. 9871, (1915) N. J. 865.
Art. 7 of the Marriage Treaty; art. 6 of the Treaty on Matrimonial
Property; Kosters, 185; E. M. Meyers in note, Sup. Ct. (June 4, 1915) W. 9871.
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means of a judicial deed. Afterwards this act was entered 
upon the
Dutch public register. The Court of Gelderland decided that 
the gift
was valid, though the Dutch law required a gift to be made by 
notarial
deed .2  The decision was right, because the lex loci had been 
observed
as to the gift itself, while the forms of the Dutch law had been 
followed
with regard to the transmission of property.
As regards obligations, also, a difference must be observed between
the form and the subject-matter itself. The law governing the 
obliga-
tion is not always the law of the place where the obligation was 
for-
mally entered into. Indeed, the rule "locus regit aetuv" should 
not be
extended farther than is warranted by' the intention of the legislator.
The subject-matter itself ought to be governed by the law which offers
the closest connection with the particular circumstances, even though
this law is not the lex loci actus.
When the law of the country where an act is performed requires
"authentic" forms, the conditions to be observed are to be judged
according to the law of the country where the act has occurred. Our
courts sustain this opinion. A German Beglaubigungsurkunde has
been accepted as an authentic document in a Dutch forgery case.
28 A
document, written by a Genoese broker who was legally authorized,
was admitted as authentic evidence regarding a contract of sale con-
cluded in Italy.29 These decisions have been rendered notwithstanding
the fact that the forms of both laws were totally different from the
Dutch forms.
With respect to statements on bills of exchange and other com-
mercial paper, every act has to be considered as a separate one.
The validity of an acceptance made in Holland has to be judged
according to Dutch law, even if the bill has been drawn abroad;30
the form of a notice of dishonor depends on the law of the country
where the bill has been protested.
31
Though article IO of the Wet A. B. is our general rule, some Dutch
laws contain special provisions concerning marriages of Dutchmen
abroad, wills, mortgages, etc. In most cases these provisions are ap-
plied more strictly than might be expected from the general rule.
PROPERTY
Inmovables. The condition of immovables and all other matters
connected therewith is to be determined according to the law of the
country where the land is situated. There is no doubt about this so-
called "statutum reale." In the first place, the law of immovables
being organized with reference to the public interests of each state,
Ct. Gelderland (May 6, 1856) W. 1765.
Trib. Almelo (Dec. 2, 1896) W. 6925.
' Trib. Rotterdam (June 24, 1914) W. 97'7, (I915) N. J. 362.
2°Trib. Amsterdam (Dec. 27, 1912) W. 9570, (913) N. J. 94.
' Ct. Amsterdam (Oct. 22, 1897) W. 7o89.
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it follows that the private law of that state as to immovables must
be supreme. Secondly, the security of intercourse requires that a right
acquired according to the lex rei sitae should be protected. The same
rule applies to the creation abroad of rights in immovables situated in
other countries. Article 7, Wet A. B., provides, therefore: "As to
immovables, the law of the country or the place where they are situ-
ated, must be applied." The rule does not include the capacity to
do acts relating to immovables. Capacity is subject to the personal
law, while the form of acts is governed by the lex loci instead of the
lex rei sitae.
There is another limitation to the application of the general rule.
Where the legal status of an estate as a whole (movables and im-
movables) is concerned-an inheritance, a community of goods be-
tween husband and wife, a bankrupt's estate, and so on-many think
that it should be governed by one law irrespective of the situs of such
property. 2 Though some of the earlier decisions support this point
of view, the Supreme Court held that every immovable belonging to
an estate was to be governed by the law of the country where it was
situated.83
Wherever the lex rei sitae is the applicable law, the conveyance of
immovables is controlled by that law. This is the case also with
respect to movables, which we shall consider in a moment. Dutch law
requires for the transfer of title the agreement of the parties and the
delivery of the property. The delivery of movables takes place by
simple transfer and that of immovables by making and delivering a
written document, which ought to be entered upon the property register.
As a consequence of this, two foreigners.are indeed competent to pass
title to property situated in Holland, but such transfer has no effect if
the provisions of the Dutch law with regard to delivery have not been
duly observed. Whenever immovables are to be transferred, there-
fore, a deed should be executed and entered upon the Dutch registers.
According to the well-known rule concerning the form of legal acts,
such a document is to be considered as valid when made abroad accord-
ing to foreign law. The registering of such documents in the Nether-
lands completes the conveyance of the property in that country.
There is one exception to the foregoing in the Dutch written law.
Article 1218 of the Civil Code states that an immovable situated in the
Netherlands, cannot be mortgaged, in the absence of a treaty, by a con-
tract entered into in another country. No such treaty exists up to the
present time.
The Dutch courts follow the same system when the property is in
a foreign country. They apply to such estates the'foreign lex rei
sitae and consider the conveyance of the property as valid if the pro-
visions of that law are satisfied, even when those of the lex fori are
different.
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Movables. One may say that- movables are so closely connected
with the owner that the personal law should govern this species of
property. According to the newer theories the national law is de-
cisive; while the countries still adhering to the law of the domicil in
their system of the conflict of laws-a rule which is disapproved in
Holland-apply that law. The latter conclusion has also been reached
by those raising the fiction that movables are always present at the
domicil of their owner, so that the lex rei sitae coincides with the
lex domicili. This fiction had some sense at the time when all mov-
able goods were taken along on one's body, or were located in one's
house, but with the increased importance of personal property it has
lost every semblance of justification.
Under these circumstances it would be much more true to fact if the
law of the place where the movable is actually to be found were
applied.3 ' The necessity of securing international intercourse sup-
ports this standpoint, for these interests require the territorial appli-
cation of the law to all movables witfiin the limits of a certain territory.
This principle is preferable to that of nationality or domicil. Every-
one acquiring in good faith rights relating to certain goods under the
law of their situs ought to be protected.
There is no express provision on the subject in the Dutch Civil
Code, but we find this principle in a decision which holds the transfer
of the property in a Belgian vessel, by virtue of a contract made in
Holland, to be subject to Belgian law, according to which a simple
contract is sufficient and transcription upon a register is not necessary.
3 5
The protection of good faith does not go any farther than is neces-
sary, especially when movables are transported to another country,
where another person whose good faith has the same claim to pro-
tection obtains rights with respect to such goods. Our law on this
question is not settled. Suppose that stolen goods are claimed by the
owner from a third party who is in possession. The various laws
prescribe a longer or a shorter time within which an action for the
recovery of stolen property must be brought. If the goods have been
stolen abroad and transported to the Netherlands, the time fixed for
the recovery of such property by the foreign law not having as yet
expired, the owner cannot demand them back from a third person who
has obtained the property in good faith, if the period fixed by Dutch
law has expired. The protection of good faith prevails in this case
over that of vested rights.
There is a difficult conflict when the property in goods transported
from one country to another, is transferred by the delivery of such
documents as bills of lading, which represent the goods. In such
cases we prefer to recognize the rights of the person who becomes in
good faith owner of the documents. The Tribunal of Rotterdam has
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held, nevertheless, that the original sender of a quantity of currants
forwarded from Patras to England, does not lose his right to stoppage
in transitu in Holland, where it lay on its way to England, though
the bill of lading had already been indorsed to an English merchant. 3
Jura in re aliena. The lex rei sitae, governing the condition of
movables and immovables, is also applicable to the jura in re aliena,
existing with respect to such property. This law decides what rights
can be created, what is their nature, and how they can be extinguished.
No rights can be created in property situated in the Netherlands,
which do not exist under Dutch law, for example, the "antichresis"
of the French law and the "mortgage" of the English law.
A question arises concerning movables: does the Dutch judge
recognize jura in re aliena created abroad according to the lex rei
sitae with respect to movables, when such goods are later on trans-
ported to the Netherlands? He will not do so when the Dutch laws
do not know such a right or differ for the greater part from the for-
eign law. Dutch law, for example, requires that a pledge should be
delivered to the pledgee; a foreign law, therefore, which does not
contain the same provision cannot be recognized in Holland to the
prejudice of third persons.
Rights established abroad must not conflict with the public policy
of the forum nor with the interests of third persons. But if no such
interests are injured, the right is deemed to be valid. It was in ac-
cordance with this system that our Courts decided that movables had
been validly pledged abroad by pledging the bill of lading, because
this kind of pledge agreed with Dutch law and no good faith of third
persons was injured.
3 7
The same point of view has been followed with respect to mort-
gages on vessels. Rights created according to the law of the flag are
recognized, even though the ship is plying between foreign ports.
Dutch courts are likely to recognize most of these rights, because they
are in conformity with Dutch law. The validity of English mortgages
on ships putting into a Dutch port has been sustained, because the
rights created thereby, like those created by Dutch mortgages, tend
to secure the creditor, and because they operate against third persons
only after being entered in public registers. It was not deemed nec-
essary, therefore, to transcribe these rights upon Dutch registers.
But the order of these rights and of those created in the Netherlands
is to be determined according to Dutch law.38
Trib. Rotterdam (Dec. 6, i9o5) W. 8447.
'Trib. Rotterdam (June 2, igio) W. 9159; Ct. The Hague (April i8, 1913)
W. 9569.
' Trib. Rotterdam (Jan. 31, 1913) W. 9525; Ct. The Hague (Dec. 24, i915) W.
9908.
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OBLIGATIONS
A sharp distinction has to be made between the laws relating to
the subject-matter of obligations and those relating to capacity and
the form of acts, especially in contracts.
Contracts in general. As to contracts the general rule of juris-
prudence is that the parties are free to state what law shall govern
their mutual relations. In other words, the principle of autonomy
controls. If a particular law has not been chosen expressly, the ques-
tion is whether the parties contracted with a particular law in mind.
39
Sometimes it is probable that a will of the parties really existed,
even if it was a silent one. This can be deduced from certain expres-
sions used in the contract, which are connected with foreign circum-
stances and institutions.4° The language used may refer to a certain
law; the mere employment of the language of a foreign country by
no means proves, however, that the law of that country ought to be
applied. 41 The way in which the parties were in the habit of con-
cluding contracts, or the mode of performing the contract in question,
may have influence. The fact that, the contract mentions a court or
certain arbitrators in a particular country as competent judges does
not prove at all that the parties intended the law of that country to
be applicable also to the obligation itself.
42 Such a clause-as well
as the language employed-may aid, however, in showing that the
parties adopted a particular law. A recent case held that when a Dutch
policy of insurance refers to the conditions and customs of the English
Lloyd's policy, such a reference does not imply that English law is
applicable to the contract as a whole. The insurance having been
taken out in the Netherlands, Dutch law will govern those matters
which have not been regulated in the Lloyd's policy.
43
In the above cases there was an actual will of the parties, though
not always plainly expressed. What is to be done if they did not
even think of the applicable law? In this case it will be best to look
for an objective standard and to construct a presumptive will of the
parties. Our decisions furnish many examples in which the judges
examined the probable intention of the parties and chose the law which
they probably would have chosen as the most suitable' one, if their
' The autonomy of the parties is taken into consideration by Ct. Amsterdam
(Dec. 31, 198o) W. 8852; Ct. The Hague (March 15, 1910) W. 8984; Trib.
Amsterdam (Dec. 22, I9II) W. 93oo.
Trib. Utrecht (March 25, 1914) W. 9754-
4 Trib. Rotterdam (March 17, igio) W. 9126; Ct. The Hague (Nov. i4, 1913)
W. 9615.
"Ct. The Hague (Feb. IO, 191i) W. 9161; Trib. Amsterdam (March 31, 1911)
W. 9208.
"Trib. Rotterdam (March 26, i919) W. 10387; id. (May 7, I919) W. 10443;
and (May i5, 1919) W. IO43z.
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attention had been drawn to it.4 4 In international law the courts will
generally select the law which has the closest connection with the
contract in question. The place where a contract has been concluded
is of great importance, because the parties are influenced by the cus-
toms and opinions of that place to such an extent that they may be
supposed to have chosen that law as the most suitable one.
Moreover, the courts are conscious of the fact that everything not
immediately touching the contract itself, such as the performance
and the consequences of non-fulfillment, has a closer connection with
the place where the contract is to be performed. Many judges say
even that the law of the place of performance governs the whole con-
tract. This opinion-which appears to prevail in the United States
over the doctrine of the personal or the domiciliary law of the debtor-
is gaining ground with the Dutch courts.
Kosters 5 defends the lex loci contractus as applicable to contracts
and bases his opinion upon a provision of the Dutch Civil Code4
which says that ambiguous contracts should be interpreted according
to the customs of the country or the place where the contract has been
concluded. Leaving out of consideration the question whether the
legislator meant to lay down a general rule of private international
law, the provision has never been cited for this purpose in any
decision, so that it is probable that the courts will seek their argu-
ments elsewhere, notwithstanding the ingenious discovery of Mr.
Kosters. The courts hold that either the lex loci contractus or the
lex loci solutionis ought to be applied, or even both of them to-
gether, each being applicable to a separate part of the contract.4
There are a great number of cases in which the law of the place of
performance is chosen, notwithstanding article 1382.48
On the other hand, we find decisions giving preference to the law
of the country where the contract has been conclided. In these cases
the performance is submitted also to that law, because the performance,
being the main part of the contract, is naturally governed by the law
applicable to the entire contract.49 The performance and the non-
fulfilment, as well as the consequences of both of these matters, are
deemed so inseparably connected that one law should be applied.
Only this restriction ought to be made in favor of the lex loci solu-
tionis, that the modes of performance are to be governed by the latter
law, especially because every country has its own customs in this
respect and because most of the laws provide that contracts also
imply the fulfilment of duties imposed by custom and usage. 50
" Ct. 's Hertogenborch (Jan. 2z, I9o) W. 7555; Ct. The Hague (March 15,
i9,o) W. 8984. "Kosters, 745. "'Art. 1382.
"' Ct. The Hague (Nov. 14, 1913), (1914) N. J. 429.
"Trib. Rotterdam (Nov. 9, 1911) W. 9345; Trib. Amsterdam (Dec. 3r, 1914)
W, P. N. R. 2358, (i9r5) N. J. 308.
* Trib. Middelburg (April 4, 1888) W. 5592; Trib. Breda (May 22, 1917),
(917) N. . 594. Art1 345, Dutch Civil Code.
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Our courts prefer the lex loci contractus to the personal or domicil-
iary law. This is so even when the contract in question is concluded
in America between a Dutch and an American citizen, or when both
parties have the Dutch nationality, but concluded their agreement in
another country in which it is to be performed.
51 The place of
contracting has an accidental character, however, so that if such a
contract has been concluded abroad between two Dutchmen and is
to be performed in their own country, their personal law must be
applied.
5 2
The courts when asked to decide a matter arising out of a contract
concluded by correspondence or by telegraph, determine generally in
the first place where the contract was made. They have a choice
between the law of the place where the offer has been accepted, that
is, where the acceptance of the offer has been declared (declaration
theory) and the law of the place where the acceptance has come to
the notice of the offeror (cognition theory). Our courts have very
generally adopted the latter system. The application of the lex loci
contractus means, therefore, the law of the place where the offeror
learned that his offer had been accepted.5 3
Difficulties may arise when the laws of the countries concerned
differ as regards the place where the contract was concluded.5 ' This
may occur with respect to Dutch and American law, because the
American law generally deems the contract made where the offer
was accepted.5 5 Kosters proposes the following solution for these
puzzles.58 According to his suggestion the law of the offeror is to be
chosen, because the offer is the starting-point of the whole matter,
and the other party, in accepting the offer, must be deemed to have
voluntarily entered into the sphere of the law of the offeror. So far
as we know this reasoning has not yet been accepted by our courts.
Contracts concluded through agents are very much influenced by
the consequences of mutual confidence. This was recognized by the
court of The Hague in a case where a contract had been concluded
at Genoa between an Italian citizen and the representative of a Dutch-
man. This representative did not possess the authority required in
cases involving the subject-matter of the particular contract, accord-
ing to Dutch law, but according to Italian law the other party was
justified in assuming that he had the requisite authority. The court
'Trib. Amsterdam (June 30, 19o) W. 8289.
County Court (Dec. 22, 1916), (1917) N. J. 132.
'Trib. Rotterdam (June 8, 19o2) W. 7859; Trib. Amsterdam (Jan. 6, 19i1)
W. 9253; Trib. Rotterdam (Oct. 26, i91) W. 94o,.
"'This involves the theory of qualifications, concerning which see E. G.
Lorenzen, Theory of Qualifications (i920) 20 CoL. L. REv. 247.
"Westlake, Private International Law (5th ed. 1912) sec. 224; Wester v.
Casein Co. (1912) 2o6 N. Y. 5o6, ioo N. E. 488, (1913) Clunet, 661.
" Kosters, 767.
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held that this party's confidence in the authority of the representative
ought to be protected, and that a valid contract had been made.51
As to interpretation of contracts, article 1378 of the Civil Code
laws down general rules of private international law. Foreign pro-
visions relating to interpretation fnay be resorted to as guides only
when the terms of the contract cannot be understood .
5
In the beginning of this chapter we said that the capacity to con-
clude contracts is not governed by the law applicable to the contract
itself, but by the personal law of each of the parties. One might
be inclined to follow the same system in respect to the lack of free
consent if caused by violence, error, or fraud, circumstances which
may affect the validity of contracts. These influences are not con-
nected, however, with the personal qualities of the parties. They
operate upon the mind from the outside and are closely connected
with the law governing the contract itself, and are to be considered,
therefore, as quite separate from the question of capacity.
Dutch courts sometimes decline to apply foreign law to contracts
when the subject-matter is connected with another country. Certain
interests, deemed to concern public policy, will prevent some contracts
from being recognized, though they have been validly concluded ac-
cording to foreign law. Although the Dutch law contains a pro-
hibition of lotteries unless authorized by special law, the sale of shares
in a foreign lottery may easily be recognized; but Dutch judges can-
not condemn a person to deliver such shares, because the taking of
an active part in the transfer of such shares is forbidden by public
policy.
The Dutch courts are unsettled with respect to the question whether
sales on margin ate to be considered as wagers prohibited by' Dutch
law. There is a tendency to affirm this question if the parties do not
intend to deliver the goods but to pay only the differences. This
very uncertainty causes such sales validly entered into to be recog-
nized in Holland as not being in conflict with any public policy.59
Let us consider for a moment the capacity of parties to deviate
by contract from the general rules relating to the jurisdiction and
competence of courts. Our courts hold that Dutchmen having their
residence abroad are competent to agree that a foreign court or
arbitrators shall determine any disputes arising out of a contract which
they have entered into. The principle of the autonomy of the parties
prevails thus over the ordinary local rules relating to the jurisdiction
of Dutch courts.60 A Dutch court may even refuse its assistance to
a party soliciting its intervention contrary to the terms of such a
contract. When a foreign court or foreign arbitrators have rendered
Ct. The Hague (June 8, 1917) W. 1o2o8.
Trib. Rotterdam (June 29) 1914, W. 8153.
Kosters, 78&
'Lyon Ct. (May 17, 1918) W. 10282, (igi8) N. J. 634.
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a decision by virtue of such a contract, the judgment forms, as it were,
a part of the contract itself, and may be enforced in Holland.
6 ' When
the party in whose interest the clause concerning the jurisdiction of
a foreign court has been inserted voluntarily neglects his privilege,
however, and brirtigs the suit before a Dutch court, the autonomy of
the parties does not go so far as to oust the Dutch court of its juris-
diction.
62
We make a single observation concerning the assignment of obliga-
tions, though the opinion of the Dutch courts can be deduced only
from their settled views concerning the law governing contracts. The
law governing the obligation of the debtor is generally the lex domicili
debitoris. This is especially the case as regards the moment at which
the debtor may validly discharge the debt by paying the new creditor.
The same law governs the question whether a legal notification is
sufficient, or whether the-assignment must be acknowledged in writing
by the debtor, as Dutch law requires.
One of the main problems concerning the performance of contracts
is that connected with acts of God (vis major). As regards inter-
national law the question is whether the effect of an act of God should
be governed by other rules than the contract itself ? Is there Vis major
when a foreign party in performing a contract subject to Dutch law,
is liable to punishment according to his national law? I think there
is some reason why the defence of vis major should be governed by
a special rule. This point of view, though supported by the lower
judges, found no favor with the Supreme Court, which held that
foreign provisions (such as the British Trading with the Enemy Act
of 1914) cannot interfere with the course of the law in the Nether-
lands; so that the punishment menacing the English debtor, cannot be
considered as an act of God with respect to a contract governed by
Dutch law.63 The same ideas are to be found in a decision holding
that a Dutch defendant cannot invoke vis major against a Dutch
plaintiff on account of a Belgian "moratorium," even if the contract
is subject to Belgian law.64 A Dutchman, appearing in Holland and
subject to Dutch law, cannot rely on the interdiction of payment with-
out the consent of the Board of the German Reichsbank, even if the
money was forwarded from Germany.6 5
There are only a few decisions regarding the influence of bankruptcy
Ct. The Hague (May 12, igI ) W. 9996; Sup. Ct. (Dec. 8, i916) W. ioo54,
(1917) N. J. 29; Trib. Amsterdam (Nov. 9, 1917),. (1918) N. J. io8; Ct.
Amsterdam (March 1, 1918) W. io269, (ig8) N, 3. Io85; Sup. Ct. (Dec. 6,
igi8), (I919)- N. J. i29.
Trib. The Hague (Jan. 8, I918) W. 10314.
Trib. Rotterdam (Dec. 17, I915) W. 9898, (I916) N. J. 434; Ct. The Hague
(Nov. 24, 1916) W. ioo6o, (19,7) N. J. 279; Sup. Ct. (Nov. 2, 1917) W. 10194,
W. P. N. R. 25o.
"Trib. Amsterdam (May 25, 1917) W. oo92.
' Trib. Utrecht (Feb. 27, I918) W. P. N. R. 2528, (1918) N. J. io48.
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on the execution of contracts, so far as international law is concerned.
An interesting case arose with respect to the question whether a pref-
erence is to be governed by the law of the country whdre the adjudica-
tion of bankruptcy took place, or by the law applicable to the contract.
The judge of first instance decided that the preference existing under
Dutch law in favor of an unpaid seller of movables cannot be recog-
nized when Belgian law governs the transaction, although the bank-
ruptcy was pronounced in the Netherlands; inasmuch as the Belgian
law does not entitle the seller of those goods to such a preference in
case of bankruptcy. The Court of Appeal held, however, that the
influence of bankruptcy upon the rights of the creditors was to be
determined according to the law of the country where the adjudication
of bankruptcy had taken place, because these consequences are closely
connected with judicial process, as is the general seizure by way of
bankruptcy. The preference is regarded, therefore, as a matter of
public policy. The Supreme Court agreed with this view. 6
Particular Contracts. Contracts for labor and services are gen-
erally governed by the law of the country where the employer resides.
All laborers in the service of one employer are therefore subject to one
law. This is the opinion of our courts, which prefer this system to
the application of the law of the place where the contract has been
concluded or is to be performed. 7 The following case will show how
little influence is sometimes attached to the place of performance.
The county judge had decided, as judge of first instance, that a con-
tract concluded in the German language between a German employer
and a German laborer, ought to be governed by Dutch law, when the
work was to be done in Holland. The non-fulfilment by the workman
of his military service in Germany could not be considered, therefore,
as a sufficient reason for the cancellation of the contract under German
law. The appellate court entertained, however, another opinion. It
applied German law to the contract and considered the non-perform-
ance of military duties as a sufficient ground to declare the contract
terminated88
The law of the contractor or the employer is also decisive in con-
tracts for work and other matters of this kind, for example, when a
public corporation appears as the employer or when the work is
regulated by the government.8 9 We could compare this practice with
the reasoning applied in insurance cases. All the insured are subject
" Trib. Amsterdam (Oct. 29, 1915), (19,5) N. J. 1236; Ct. Amsterdam (Nov.
3, 1916), (1917) N. J. 353; Sup. Ct. (June 15, 1917), (1917) N. J. 812.
"Trib. Rotterdam (Dec. 2, 1896) W. 6993; Trib. Amsterdam (June 30, 1905)
W. 8289; Trib. Amsterdam (Dec. 22, I91) W. 93oo.
County Ct. Amsterdam (Oct. i9, I915), (1915) N. J. iio8; Trib. Amsterdam
(Jan. i8, i918) W. P. N. R. 2529, (I918) N. J. 625.
'Trib. Amsterdam (April 25, I913) W, 9579.
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to a single law, viz. the law of the place where the insurance company
has its domicil.
The contract of sale is governed by the ordinary rules. When the
sale has taken place in public, at a market or an exchange, the law of
the place wheie the act has been performed is the proper one.70 If
any localization 'is impossible, it is preferable to apply the law which
the parties have either expressly or impliedly chosen. As to contracts
of lease, the situation of the rented immovable or the purpose for
which it is to be used, will have a predominant influence.
It would lead us too far to treat in detail the obligations incurred
by signing commercial paper. We shall merely illustrate the above-
mentioned rules by stating that when obligations arising from bills
payable to order or to bearer are in question, each act is governed by
the law of the place where the particular contract was made. In
this way the law of the place where a bill had been drawn governs
the drawing itself,T1 and the law of the place of acceptance governs
the latter. Indeed, third persons ought to be able to rely upon the fact
that the consequences of every obligation are subject to the law of the
country where the external distinctive mark of the obligation has
been called into existence. The person acquiring the bill in good faith
must be recognized as a holder.72 In the same way the law of the
place where a bill has been endorsed decides whether the right to
demand payment can be transferred by endorsement in blank.73
Dutch law does not know quasi-contracts. Our legislation merely
knows obligations derived from contracts and those imposed by the
law, irrespective of agreement; the latter consist of obligations aris-
ing from facts and those arising from torts. Obligations arising from
facts result from the voluntary performance of another person's
business (the "negotiorum gestio" of Roman law) and from undue
enrichment. Some authors consider the place where the act was done
as decisive, disregarding the autonomy of the will, because the ob-
ligation is created'by law. Others recognize, however, the influence
of the will. They compare the performance of another's business with
a supposed representation and the undue enrichment with the per-
formance of a contract, in which a duty to pay exists on one side.
Generally speaking, Kosters74 prefers the former solution. According
to this writer there is rarely a special law which the person doing the
act had in mind. The personal law of both parties could only be
applied, if their personal law is the same and different from the le%
loci actus. In most cases the latter law is decisive. There are no
Dutch decisions on this subject.
(To be continued)
t0Ct. Amsterdam (June i, i9o6) W. 8437.
"Ct. The Hague (Nov. io, I9o3) W. 8a7.
Jitta, 451.
"Ct. 's Hertogenborch (June 30, i885) W. 53,4. "Kosters, 790.
